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Abstract
We explore the consequences of the utility requirement on speed of
innovation and welfare. A weak utility requirement means that an inter-
mediate technology with no immediate application or commercial value
is patentable. Using a model of two stage innovation with free entry and
trade secrecy, we identify cases when patentability is beneﬁcial to society.
Although a ﬁrm may undertake basic research protected by trade secrecy,
patentability is still desirable when spillover is high and innovation costs
are high. However, patentability becomes less desirable as basic research
costs decrease. We also show that high value of ﬁnal technology by itself
does not favor non-patentability and identify condition when it does.
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11 Introduction
Utility, together with novelty and the inventive step (or non-obviousness), con-
stitutes the three basic requirements for patentability. It requires that the in-
vention can bring about a speciﬁc technical eﬀect. When research is directly
guided by “real-world” necessities, it is easy to establish the utility of inventions.
However, when it is driven by scientiﬁc discovery, it may be an “intermediate
technology”, the real world utility of which can be determined only after further
research. For instance, the immediate application of a gene sequence or a new
chemical entity may not be clear without substantial further research. The util-
ity requirement may reject patentability of such an intermediate technology. A
weak utility requirement implies that the intermediate technology is patentable.
Despite the increasing importance of the utility standard in science-driven
innovations, there are almost no substantive economic analysis of the standard.
Harhoﬀ, Regibeau and Rockett (2001) is one exception in this regard, although
there have been some legal analysis of this issue, notably Grady and Alexander
(1992), Merges (1997), and Heller and Eisenberg (1998). The purpose of this
paper is to present a framework and analyze the welfare implications of the
utility standard.
The economic rationale of the utility standard can be best clariﬁed in the
context of cumulative innovation. Although similar in structure, our research
issue and our formulation diﬀer from previous cumulative innovation analysis
in several ways. First, past studies on novelty standard and forward protection
in the context of cumulative innovation have focused on the patentability of
the follow-up invention and the infringement possibility of such an invention on
the prior invention (Scotchmer and Green (1995), Denicolo (2000), to name a
few). That is, the ﬁrst stage invention is assumed to be patentable and has a
stand alone value. In our analysis, the ﬁrst stage innovation is an intermediate
1technology and further research is necessary to realize its potential value. The
issue for us is to analyze whether the high standard of utility standard which
can reject the patentability of such intermediate technology is welfare increasing
or not, while assuming patentability of the second stage invention. By deﬁnition
of intermediate technology, the second stage invention always infringes on the
ﬁrst stage invention, when the latter is patented.
Secondly we incorporate both trade secrecy and spillover. With intermediate
technology, involuntary disclosure is unlikely because the technology is used
only for further research. It may remain within the conﬁnes of a building or
limited number of people within the inventing ﬁrm. Thus trade secret protection
is available even if patent protection is not. However trade secrecy loses its
protective power once competitors obtain the technology independently or if
there is unintentional spillover. And spillovers often occur through academic
publications and contacts among researchers, both of which are signiﬁcant in
science-driven innovations.
Since we assume free entry in the ﬁrst stage basic research, the rent obtained
from the commercialization of the ﬁnal technology is dissipated, irrespective of
the patentability of intermediate research. In the patentability case, it will be
dissipated more in the ﬁrst stage (larger ﬁrst stage expenditures and more entries
in ﬁrst stage competition). We show that preventing dissipation of the rent in
the second stage through a patent is welfare improving even if trade secrecy
enables the ﬁrst stage basic research, particularly if spillover is very likely, or
basic research is very expensive. In addition, the patentability improves welfare
when intermediate technologies require very high investment in the development
stage for commercialization, so that entry in the ﬁrst stage is barely proﬁtable
without patentability.
The relative advantage of patentability declines as basic research costs be-
2come smaller. When the marginal cost of basic research becomes very small, we
show that patentability reduces welfare. This is because when the cost of basic
research is low, it is more welfare-improving to promote development by elim-
inating market power. Thus relaxing the utility requirement for intermediate
technologies that are mere “ideas” would not be socially desirable.
We also show that high value of the ﬁnal technology by itself does not favor
strong utility requirement i.e., rejection of the patentability of the intermedi-
ate technology, even if appropriation with trade secrecy protection is eﬀective.
Patentability of the intermediate technology improves welfare even under such
circumstance if the marginal research cost of the ﬁrst stage is suﬃciently large
compared to the marginal cost of the second stage or if the interest rate is
suﬃciently high. This is because both high interest rate and low second stage
marginal cost cause high investment in the second stage even under monopoly.
Thus welfare loss from patentability and the resulting market power is limited
under these circumstances.
In the remainder of this section, we present a brief background and issues
regarding the utility requirement and review the previous works we feel our
work is most closely related. We also clarify the diﬀerence between the utility
and the novelty standards. The main analysis based on a two-stage patent race
is in Section 2 followed by a section on welfare. We discuss the implications of
the major assumptions and extensions in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5
with policy implications of our results.
Utility and description requirements
Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Law stipulates the utility requirement by the
following statement “Whoever invents any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, improvement thereof, or composition of matter ... may obtain a
3patent therefore ...”1 The recent guidelines of the USPTO interprets that Sec-
tion 101 requires that “an invention must be supported by a speciﬁc, substantial
and credible utility ...” According to the guideline, utility speciﬁc to the subject
matter, instead of general utility, has to be claimed. Utilities that require or
constitute carrying out further research to identify or reasonably conﬁrm a “real
world” context of use are not substantial utilities. In addition, an assertion is
credible unless the logic underlying the assertion is seriously ﬂawed, or the facts
upon which the assertion is based are inconsistent with the logic underlying the
assertion. The utility requirement is also implicit in Section 112, which requires
written descriptions of the invention and of the manner and process of making
and using it without undue experimentation.”
Traditionally, utility requirement has been an issue in the chemical indus-
try. In this industry, research may yield synthesized compounds for which no
particular use is known. A 1966 U.S. Supreme Court ruling (“Brenner ruling”)
supports the denial of the patent for such compounds if it fails to disclose any
utility, even though it is closely related to another compound which is useful. 2
However this ruling is considered to represent the “high-water mark” of utility
doctrine (Merges (1997)). The recent ruling in re Brana in 1995 seems to be
based on logic conﬂicting the previous Supreme Court Ruling. It established
that utility for pharmaceutical products can be established by animal testing.3
1The law of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not regarded to be
patentable subject matter.
2“Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a particular product shown to
be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It
may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power
to block oﬀ whole areas of scientiﬁc development, without compensating beneﬁt to the public.
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a
patent monopoly is the beneﬁt derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.
··· But a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation
for its successful conclusion.” Brenner v. Manson, 383 U. S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689
(1966)
3“FDA approval, however, is not a prerequisite for ﬁnding a compound useful within the
meaning of patent laws. Usefulness in patent law, and in particular in the context of pharma-
ceutical inventions, necessarily includes the expectation of further research and development.
The stage at which an invention in this ﬁeld becomes useful is well before it is ready to be
4More recently, utility and enablement requirement has become a big issue in
biotechnology industry where innovation are driven by scientiﬁc progress. Re-
cent scientiﬁc advances have resulted in intermediate technology such as iden-
tiﬁed gene sequences. This is critical for but only useful by making further
research possible. In applying for a patent on partial genetic sequences (ex-
pressed sequences tags or EST) in 1991, the NIH (Dr. Craig Venter) claimed
that these can be used as diagnostic probes, identiﬁcation of chromosomes, etc,
which are uncertain general utilities. The NIH gave up patenting in 1994, when
it faced a rejection by the USPTO based on utility and other requirements,
as well as strong criticism from scientiﬁc and the other circles. (See Aoki and
Nagaoka (2002) for more on biotechnology and the utility standard.)
The patentability of research results is especially critical for the ﬁrms spe-
cialized in research, very important players in the U.S. biotechnology industry.
Since these ﬁrms do not have internal assets to implement downstream research
such as clinical testing, patents for intermediate research results are essential for
them to sell the research outputs or to attract investment money for engaging
in downstream research. The head of the leading U.S. biotechnology venture
ﬁrm states that “Some argue that the invention is not complete until the precise
biological activity of an individual gene is identiﬁed; indeed, there is some in-
dication that the Patent Oﬃce intends to apply the new guidelines in this way.
This argument ignores the real world utility, described above, associated with
the isolation, sequencing and identiﬁcation of genes and their classiﬁcation into
categories whose general functions are known. If this standard were to apply,
then only those companies that adhered to the ineﬃcient, vertically-integrated
pharmaceutical industry model would be entitled to patents. This approach
administered to humans. Were we to require Phase II testing in order to prove utility, the as-
sociated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent protection on promising
new inventions, thereby eliminating the incentive to pursue, through research and develop-
ment, potential cures in many crucial areas such as the treatment of cancer.” In re Brana 51
F. 3d 1560, 34 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
5would be at odds with the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry, with its
attendant eﬃciencies.”(Testimony of Randal Scott, president and chief scientiﬁc
oﬃcer of Incyte Genomics Inc., before the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property, July 13, 2000) We discuss the application
of our analysis to such an “outside” innovator in Section 5.
The utility standard can also become an issue with concept patents. That
is, the patenting of a general product or business ideas that use new technology.
The concept is novel but is a mere idea acquired at very little cost. It has little
role in advancing knowledge, but which has to be used widely in applying a new
technology. Such a concept patent would discourage R&D investment for using
the new technology, since it enables the patentee to collect royalty, but does
not aid R&D at all in terms of knowledge. Such an invention may be rejected
based on a non-obviousness requirement, but can also be rejected based on the
absence of speciﬁc utility.
Existing literature
Matutes, Regibeau, and Rocket (1996) also explore optimal patent policy in a
two stage innovation process where the ﬁrst stage is basic research and has no
stand alone value. They explore the trade-oﬀ between disclosure and protec-
tion of basic research. Our paper focuses on trade-oﬀ between ﬁrst and second
stage innovations (Chang (1995), O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998),
O’Donoghue (1999), Denicolo, V. and P. Zanchettin (2002) and others. See
Scotchmer (forthcoming) for overview of sequential innovation). However be-
cause of free-entry in each stage, strength (including no protection) not just
shift the proﬁt between ﬁrst and second stage but how much rent is dissipated
at each stage.
In this section we review four papers that we believe our work is most
closely related. Grossman and Shapiro (1987) analyze whether ﬁrms support
6patentability of intermediate technology in the framework of a two-stage race
among duopolists, in which the completion of the ﬁrst stage research is necessary
for commencing the second stage research but the ﬁrst stage research has no
commercial value. Based on simulations, they suggest that intermediate patent
may be beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms ex-post (i.e., after the ﬁrst stage research), but
not ex-ante, since it intensiﬁes competition. They assume that an intermediate
patent requires the competing ﬁrm to drop out of the second stage research
race, so that the second stage research is always a monopoly. They do not con-
sider the possibility of trade secret protection and their focus is strictly ﬁrm’s
incentive and overall welfare is not analyzed.
Scotchmer and Green (1990) analyze the novelty standard with respect to
the interim innovation also in a duopoly framework. The focus of their analysis
is the role of the patent in facilitating disclosure, which accelerates research in
their model. They take into account the possibility that a ﬁrm chooses trade
secret protection for intermediate technology even if it is patentable. They ﬁnd
that a weak novelty requirement promotes disclosure while it does not undermine
ex-ante proﬁt signiﬁcantly, and that the ﬁrst-to-ﬁle regime encourages disclosure
more than the ﬁrst-to-invent regime (see Aoki and Nagaoka (2002) Appendix for
how these ﬁndings can be carried over to the case of the utility standard). Their
analysis, however, cannot be considered as an analysis of the utility standard in
the context of cumulative innovation, for the following two reasons. First, they
assume that the second innovation does not infringe the ﬁrst innovation, even if
the latter is patented. However, in those cases where the utility standard is an
issue with respect to the patentability of the intermediate technology, the second
innovation infringes the ﬁrst innovation, if the latter is patented, since the ﬁrst
innovation provides a crucial input to the second stage research. Second, they
assume that the intermediate technology can have a direct commercial value
7and can compete with the ﬁnal innovation. Obviously this is not the case when
utility of the ﬁrst stage technology is in question.
Denicolo (2000) analyzes the optimal degree of forward protection of the ﬁrst
innovation in the framework of a two-stage patent race with free entry in both
stages. He analyzes the economic eﬀects of the patentability of the secondary
innovation and its potential infringement of the ﬁrst innovation, or the degree
of forward protection, assuming the patentability of the ﬁrst stage innovation.
He shows that strong forward protection becomes less attractive as the rela-
tive proﬁtability of the ﬁrst innovation increases and the relative diﬃculty of
obtaining it decreases. Although we use and extend his analytical framework,
we address a very diﬀerent issue. We analyze the economic consequences of
the patentability of the ﬁrst innovation by comparing the case where the ﬁrst
innovation is patentable under the weak standard of utility and the case where
it is not patentable due to the strong standard of utility so that it can only
be protected by trade secret. In terms of structure of the model, although the
ﬁrst case (the patentable case) becomes equivalent either to UI (the secondary
innovation is unpatentable and infringing) or PI (the secondary innovation is
patentable and infringing) in the Denicolo analysis, the second case where the
ﬁrst innovation is protected only by trade secret is completely out of the scope
of his analysis. In addition, we incorporate ﬁxed cost of research in the analysis,
since duplicative aspects or economy of scale may be important especially in the
development stage of innovation.
Finally, Harhoﬀ, Regibeau and Rockett (2001) analyze the eﬀect of the
patentability of the ﬁrst stage innovation in the framework of a two-stage R&D
race in the context of genetically modiﬁed food. They show that gene patents
(the patentability of the ﬁrst stage innovation) causes ineﬃcient stockpiling of
gene patents when interest rate is low. This result, however, depends on very
8restrictive supply response of the ﬁrms as assumed in their analysis: ﬁxed R&D
resources of the duopoly incumbent ﬁrms and no entry.
2 The Model
We assume free entry into both the ﬁrst basic research stage (R stage) and the
second development stage (D stage) innovation competition unless it is con-
strained by patent protection or trade secrecy. Unlike Denicolo, we assume that
it is possible for a ﬁrm to resort to trade secrecy to protect the intermediate
technology. This is a viable option because the technology is used only for the
purpose of further research.
However the shortcoming of trade secret protection for a ﬁrm is that it does
not prevent rivals from using the same technology if it is obtained independently.
This is one of the essential diﬀerences between trade secrecy and patent protec-
tion. Thus a ﬁrm using trade secret protection faces potential competition in the
second stage. (In fact with Poisson discovery process, another ﬁrm will succeed
the R stage with probability one.) Since we assume that research expenditure
in each stage is completely sunk once commenced, there is no reason for a ﬁrm
in R stage to drop out of competition when another ﬁrm has completed the
R stage, unless it believes that it cannot proﬁtably enter the D stage research
competition.
We assume that an intermediate technology is either a type that spills over
completely or a type that does not. We denote by γ the probability that the
technology is the type that spills over. This probability is common knowledge.
Once the R stage is completed, i.e., a ﬁrm obtains the intermediate technology
successfully, the ﬁrm knows immediately which type the technology is. If the
technology is the spillover type, spillover occurs immediately unless it is pro-
9tected by a patent.4 In this case D stage will be competitive with free entry. If
the technology is the no spillover type (which is the case with probability 1−γ),
then trade secrecy will be eﬀective unless technology is obtained independently.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm i chooses research intensity xit for cost ct for R&D at
stage t, where t = R or t = D. Discovery in each stage follows a Poisson process.
We assume there is a ﬁxed cost ft to participate in stage t. If the intermediate
technology is patentable, then the patentee will be the sole developer of the
ﬁnal technology.5 Because it is an intermediate technology, there is no direct
commercial value to the result of the R stage innovation.6 The value of the ﬁnal
technology is v.
We consider two cases, when the intermediate technology is patentable and
when it is not. If it is patentable, whoever succeeds the R stage has a choice
of patenting. The regime when the intermediate technology is not patentable is
the same as the no patenting decision even when the technology is patentable.
2.1 D Stage investment
We will ﬁrst analyze the D stage investment behavior under the two regimes.
We characterize the equilibrium investments, the patenting choice and the cor-
responding proﬁts.7
The intermediate technology is Patentable
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium investment when the ﬁrm has a patent on
the intermediate technology (P). There is no spillover because patent protec-
4Successful completion is observed by all ﬁrms and thus other ﬁrms will also know imme-
diately which type the technology is.
5Because of the Poisson discovery process, there is no advantage to licensing and having
many ﬁrms engage in R&D. Of course a ﬁrm may be forced to license if it does not possess
resources to engage in D stage. This case is discussed in Section three. Even in this case, the
particular innovation technology implies there should only be one licensee
6This is equivalent to Denicolo’s UI or PI with v1 = 0.
7D stage constitutes a subgame of the two stage game. The equilibrium we characterize is
part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy.
10tion is perfect. It will be shown later that a ﬁrm always prefers to patent the
intermediate technology if this is legally possible.
When the ﬁrm has the patented technology, it is able to invest as a monop-
olist. It chooses x to maximize,
Z ∞
0
exp−(x+r)τxvdτ − cDx − fD =
xv
x + r
− cDx − fD.




















cDr)2 > fD. (2)
The equilibrium D stage proﬁt when the intermediate technology is patented is,
πP
D = πm and the corresponding investment is XP
D = xm.
The intermediate technology is Not Patentable
When the intermediate technology is not patentable (N), there are two sub-
games after completion of the R stage, depending on the type of technology:
one with spillover (probability γ) and one without (probability 1 − γ). If there
is spillover, the ﬁrm must compete with new entrants in the D stage on equal
footing. If there is no spillover, the ﬁrm can invest to exploit the ﬁrst mover
advantage.
11We start with the case with spillover. There are n ﬁrms (the number de-
termined in equilibrium) in D stage competition. We follow the methodolgy of







j=1 xj+r)τxivdτ −cDxi −fD =
xiv
Pn
j=1 xj + r
−cDxi −fD. (3)
Since the second order condition is satisﬁed, the following ﬁrst order condition





j6=i xj + r
(xi +
P
j6=i xj + r)2 − cD = 0. (4)
There will be an incentive to invest a positive amount when this marginal proﬁt
is positive at xi = 0 which is the case by virtue of assumption (2).
In symmetric equilibrium with free entry, proﬁt given by (3) should equal 0
and xj = x for all j. Equations (3) and (4) become
xv
nx + r
− cDx − fD = 0,
(n − 1)x + r
(nx + r)2 v − cD = 0.
The two equations characterize the equilibrium investment and the equilibrium
number of ﬁrm.






Ignoring the integer problem, we have the equilibrium number of ﬁrms engaged
8All summation hereafter will be for i = 1,...,n unless noted j 6= i which is for j =
1,...,i − 1,i + 1,...n.










Number of ﬁrms is decreasing in both ﬁxed and marginal costs. Investment by
each ﬁrm is also decreasing in marginal cost but will be increasing in ﬁxed cost














Larger ﬁxed cost can increase or decrease investment of each ﬁrm, depending
on which eﬀect is larger: less ﬁrms or more investment per ﬁrm. The total
investment with spillover is however always decreasing in both costs,






The equilibrium proﬁt when there is spillover is zero, i.e., πS = 0.
If there is no spillover, the ﬁrm acts as an incumbent in D stage anticipating
entry. It invests to such an extent that even an entrant expecting no further
entries cannot make money. Although we focus on the entry deterrence strategy
in the following analysis, the major conclusions of the analysis would apply in
the case of the entry accommodation strategy as discussed in Section 4. The




exp−(xe+x+r)τxvdτ − cDx − fD =
xev
xe + x + r
− cDxe − fD. (6)
The entrant will invest to maximize this proﬁt, given incumbent’s investment





(xe + x + r)2 − cD = 0.
The incumbent will choose x so that proﬁt πe will be zero even when the entrant




















This condition requires that the ﬁxed cost not be too large and is also a suﬃcient
condition for πm ≥ 0. If this condition does not hold, then entry will be blocked
with monopoly investment. Note that xb → X0 as fD → 0: entry deterrence is
impossible if there is no ﬁxed cost.
The equilibrium proﬁt with entry deterrence will be,






























The entry deterrence proﬁt is decreasing in cD. It is also decreasing in the ﬁxed
cost, fD, when it is large but increasing in ﬁxed cost when fD is small, relative
to v. While larger fD means it is possible to deter entry with smaller deviation
from the monopoly proﬁt, it also directly reduces proﬁt (including the monopoly
proﬁt). The positive eﬀect dominates only when fD is small.
Summarizing, investment (xNS) and proﬁt (πNS) when there is no spillover
are xb and πb if (7) holds, and xm and πm if (7) does not hold. Hereafter
we assume that condition (7) holds. The equilibrium D stage proﬁt of the
14ﬁrm successful in R stage9 as anticipated at the beginning of the game (taking
into account that Nature determines type of technology) when the intermediate
technology is not patentable is,
πN
D = γπS + (1 − γ)πNS = γ0 + (1 − γ)πb. (9)
πN
D is always less than πm for any probability of spillover γ and strictly less for
γ > 0. We make the following observation about relative size,
Lemma 1. Assuming that condition (7) holds, then
xm < xb = xNS < X0, πm > πb = πNS > πN > πN
D > 0.
Both xb and X0 are linear in v (maximum order is v) but xm is order of
√
v. Reduction of research investment due to monopoly power increases with
value of the ﬁnal patent, v. Since πP
D = πm > πN
D, due to (7) and the positive
probability of spillover (γ > 0),
Corollary 1. A ﬁrm will always patent the intermediate technology if it is
patentable.
In our framework patent enforcement is perfect and there is no spillover
related to patenting. Even if trade secret protection is perfect, it oﬀers no
protection against independent innovation. This alone makes patent protection
always more attractive.
9The other ﬁrms’ proﬁts are zero.
152.2 R stage investment
General solution of R stage
We derive a general solution for R stage when the payoﬀ to the winner from the
D stage is pD and losers get nothing. Firm i’s expected payoﬀ when it invests





j6=i xj + r
− cRxi − fR. (10)





j6=i xj + r
(xi +
P
j6=i xj + r)2πD − cR = 0. (11)
There will be an incentive to invest a positive amount when this marginal proﬁt
is positive at xi = 0 which will hold if πD > cRr.






In order for this to be positive (interior solution), proﬁt from the next stage
must be suﬃciently large, πD > fR. Investment is decreasing in marginal cost
and increasing in D stage proﬁt πD. The eﬀect of ﬁxed cost on investment is
analogous to (5). Ignoring the integer problem, we have the equilibrium number
10In symmetric equilibrium with free entry, (10) should equal 0 and xj = x for all j.
Equations (10) and (11) become
xπD
nx + r
− cRx − fR = 0,
(n − 1)x + r
(nx + r)2 πD − cR = 0.
The two equations characterize the equilibrium investment and number of ﬁrms.










The number of ﬁrms is also decreasing in both costs and increasing in D stage
proﬁt πD. The aggregate investment, XR is,










if πD is suﬃciently large and XR = 0 otherwise. This is also increasing in D
stage proﬁt. The equilibrium investments when the intermediate technology is
patentable, XP
R, and when not patentable, XN
R can be found by substituting
the appropriate equilibrium proﬁts from D stage, πP
D and πN
D. Equation (12),
together with Lemma 1 shows how investment is increased in one stage at the
cost of reducing it in the other.
Proposition 1. Patentability of the intermediate technology increases R stage
research investment but reduces D stage investment.
From (12), we can make the following observation:
Lemma 2. When the intermediate technology is not patentable, spillover must
be suﬃciently unlikely and costs (cD,cR, fR) small enough for there to be in-
vestment in the intermediate technology. That is,
XN
R > 0 ⇔
p










Recall that D stage equilibrium proﬁt πD will be low when D stage marginal
cost is high. This lemma shows that if D stage marginal cost is increased, there
must be a corresponding decrease in R stage costs, or there will no investment
in basic research . Not surprisingly, very high likelihood of spillover results in
17no R stage investment.
3 Welfare
The value of technology v is the ﬁrm’s private value. This does not capture the






is the “adjusted probability” of innovating (Denicolo (2000)). It discounts the
value according to the delay which is distributed according to a Poisson process.
The expected welfare is, denoting investments in R stage and D stage by XR
and XD,
W(XR,XD) = P(XR){P(XD)(v + s) − cDXD − nDfD} − cRXR − nRfR.
From Lemma 2, we can immediately identify a case when patentability will
unambiguously improve welfare.
Corollary 2. If there is no R stage investment without patentability and if there
is with patentability, then patentability will improve welfare.
There will be no R stage investment when condition (13) does not hold
in which case welfare will be zero. The condition is violated when costs in
either stage is very large. Given that a ﬁrm can recover investment in R stage
research only from commercialization of D stage innovation, not only high cost
of R stage research but also high marginal cost of D stage research tends to
favor patentability of the intermediate technology. Thus if an intermediate
technology requires a large amount of additional work (high investment costs)
for commercialization, this would be precisely the situation when making the
18intermediate technology patentable will improve welfare.
Noting that proﬁt is bid down to zero in equilibrium through both stages






R ){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb)}s = P(XR((1 − γ)πb)){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb)}s.
Superscripts N and P denote when intermediate technology is “not patentable”
and “patentable”.
An iso-welfare curve in (XR,XD) space is depicted in Figure 1 for γ = 0 and
XD = xb. Convexity can be derived as in Denicolo (2000). The ﬁgure demon-
strates the trade-oﬀ involved in making intermediate technology patentable.
Patentability increases XR and reduces XD (Proposition 1). In the ﬁgure, this
means patentability will change investments in the direction of the arrows.
We begin with establishing the following relationship, analogous to Propo-
sition 5 of Denicolo (2000).
Lemma 3. The ratio WP/WN is (i) increasing in cR and (ii) increasing in
fR.
Proof is in the Appendix.
This ratio (WP/WN) being greater or less than 1 determines if welfare is
higher or lower with patentability. The exact conditions are established in the
following propositions. First, we characterize the relationship between R&D
costs and the welfare eﬀect of patentability using Lemma 3.
Proposition 2. (i) Patentability of intermediate technology improves social
welfare if marginal cost of basic research is very high and reduces it if marginal
19cost of basic research is very low. More generally, there is a c∗
R such that
WP T WN ⇔ cR T c∗
R. (14)
(ii) Patentability of intermediate technology improves welfare if ﬁxed cost of basic
research is very high, so that development research with patentability becomes
barely proﬁtable. That is, there is a f∗
R such that
fR > f∗
R ⇒ WP > WN.
(iii) Similarly, patentanbility always improves social welfare when marginal and
ﬁxed costs of development are large. That is,






Proof is in the Appendix.









means R stage investment XR is very small. In Figure 1 it would be a point
such as T, a point at which the change in investments from patentability im-
proves welfare. On the other hand, small cR implies XR is large, such as point S
in Figure 1. Social welfare depends on the product of the adjusted probability of
D stage success and that of R stage success. As a result, when the probability R
stage success is high due to lower research cost of that stage (low cR), it is more
eﬃcient to encourage the expansion of the D stage reward. Since patentabil-







R ) with respect to fR and cR implies that the critical
value c∗
R is decreasing in fR. The range of R stage marginal cost for which
20patentability is undesirable becomes smaller when the ﬁxed cost is larger.
We now characterize the relationship between extent of possible spillover
and the welfare eﬀect of patentability. Using (9) and Lemma 1, the adjusted
probability for R stage is, for any γ,
P(XN
R ) = P(XR((1 − γ)πb)) < P(XR(πP
D)) = P(XR(πm)).
P(XN
R ) is decreasing in γ and approaches zero as γ approaches unity. On the
other hand,
γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb) > P(XP
D) = P(xm),
holds for any γ. Greater spillover beneﬁts society at the D stage but it has an
adverse eﬀect on R stage investment. Using (1), (8), and (12), we are able to
identify the minimum γ above which patentability of the intermediate technol-
ogy is beneﬁcial to society.
Proposition 3. Patentability of intermediate technology always improves social
welfare when spillover is very large. That is, there is always a level γP such that
for all γ ≥ γP the following holds,
WP > WN.
Proof is in the Appendix.
Although spillover increases D stage investment, proﬁt is dissipated by free
entry. This will reduce the incentive to invest in the R stage. Note that this is
independent of the size of ﬁxed costs.
We synthesize the previous propositions by the following proposition per-
taining to large v.
Proposition 4. When the ﬁnal technology is very valuable, patentability is
21desirable if and only if the following condition holds:
√
rcR > 2(1 − γ)
p
cDfD.
That is, only if the above condition holds,
WP > WN,
for suﬃciently large v.
Proof is in the Appendix.
The proposition shows that the high value of the ﬁnal technology by itself
does not determine if the patentability of intermediate technology is desirable
or not, despite appropriation via trade secrecy. We can interpret the above
inequality in the following manner. When the value of the ﬁnal technology is
high, whether the patentability is desirable or not depends only on the ratio
between XP
D and XN
R , which are the levels of investments of the respective
critical stages of the patentability and non-patentability regimes. When interest
rate r is high or cD is low, the investment in the development stage is high, even
when the intermediate technology is patentable and the second stage innovation
is monopolized. The monopoly investment increases as r increases because high
interest rate induces a monopoly ﬁrm to realize the invention quickly so as
to avoid heavy discounting. Therefore the patentability is desirable. On the
other hand, when fD is high so that the development stage proﬁt is high under
non-patentability regime,11 or when cR is low, the investment in the ﬁrst stage
is high even when the intermediate technology is not patentable. This makes
the patentability of intermediate research undesirable. In sum, balancing the
incentives for the two stages still matter even if the ﬁnal technology has a very
11Equation (8) shows that the proﬁt of the ﬁrm successful in the research stage increases
with fD when v is very large (equation (5)).
22high value. Conditions on γ and cR are consistent with Propositions 2 and 3.
4 Discussions of the implications of major as-
sumptions and extensions
We have developed the analysis, assuming that intermediate technology owner
is an integrated ﬁrm, able to engage in D stage innovation. If only independent
innovators can engage in R stage research and only the ex-post licensing is fea-
sible, patentability of intermediate technology becomes socially more desirable
since such ﬁrm must share the proﬁt from the D stage research with the licensee
under most circumstances. If the patentee appropriates all the rent, our anal-
ysis follows, including the welfare results. This would be the case if there is
free entry into the licensee market, or if the patentee is able to make a take or
leave it oﬀer. Any other license bargaining (strategic or Nash Bargaining) will
result in the independent inventor’s rent being reduced which weakens R stage
incentive.
While we assumed that the ﬁrm successful in the research stage adopts the
entry deterrence strategy in the non-patentability case (i.e. when the interme-
diate technology is protected only by trade secret), our main conclusions should
hold when the ﬁrm adopts the entry accommodation strategy from the follow-
ing observation. It is natural for us to assume that the aggregate investment in
the D stage (XD) without patentability is higher than with patentability (i.e.
xm < Xa < X0), even if the ﬁrm adopts an entry accommodation strategy, as in
the case when it adopts entry deterrence strategy. Moreover, D stage competi-
tion due to non-patentability reduces both the expected revenue from entry and
the diﬀerence in proﬁts of the winner and the losers of the R stage competition
relative to the case with patentability, so that the aggregate investment in the
23R stage would be lower without patentability. This provides a reason why the
claim of Proposition 1 would continue to hold. Corollary 2 also holds since the
welfare can become positive only if P(XR) is positive.
As for Proposition 2, equation (14) relies on the monotonicity of the ra-
tio WP/WN (Lemma 3) which depends on the functional form. However the
proposition will still be true for extreme values of costs. As the marginal or
ﬁxed costs of R stage research becomes large, the investment in that stage de-
clines toward zero, since entry in the research itself will become unproﬁtable
eventually. Such threshold costs continue to be lower with non-patentability,
since competition in the D stage reduces the expected proﬁt from the entry. On
the other hand, the reduction of investment due to the monopolization of the D
stage investment continues to be bounded. Thus patentability of basic research
becomes welfare improving. On the other hand, as the marginal cost of R stage
research (cR) tends to zero, investment level in that stage would increase indef-
initely even if the winning ﬁrm adopts the entry accommodation strategy. This
is because the additional investment by a ﬁrm always increases its proﬁt (i.e the
marginal revenue remains positive) by increasing the chance of early discovery.
Thus, the ratio of the adjusted probabilities for the R stage is close to 1 for
a very small cR. Consequently, patentability of intermediate research becomes
welfare reducing for such cR. Finally it is self evident that Proposition 3 also
continues to hold.
As for the last proposition, high ﬁxed cost of research fD will no longer favor
non-patentability when the ﬁrm adopts the entry accommodation strategy. The
investment in the R stage with non-patentability increases as the development
stage proﬁt increases. That proﬁt, however, can decline as fD increases when
the ﬁrm adopts the entry accommodation strategy (this would be the case for
the ranges of fD where the number of ﬁrms which enter in the development
24competition is independent of fD). Thus, while high interest rate, high cR and
low cD would continue to make patentability desirable as in the case of entry
deterrence strategy, high fD can favor patentability.
5 Concluding Remarks
We can derive several policy implications from our analysis. The implications
of Proposition 2 is that even if trade secrecy protects intermediate technology,
patentability is still beneﬁcial if research costs are high. Such technoology’s
possibility of spillover reinforces the case for patentability (Proposition 3). On
the other hand, patentability should be rejected when the intermediate tech-
nology covers a mere “idea” that is easy to acquire. Given the high value of
ﬁnal technology, Proposition 4 suggests, that reduction of the marginal cost of
basic research relative to the marginal cost of development, due to, for exam-
ple, subsidy or tax breaks, makes unpatentability of intermediate technology
more desirable. We also showed that high interest rate is more likely to make
the patentability of intermediate technology desirable (Proposition 4). It fol-
lows that when the intermediate technology results in a very valuable product,
society with high interest rate beneﬁts from weak utility requirement.
Because of constant returns to scale nature of innovation of our model, hav-
ing more ﬁrms engage in innovation will not increase the return from innova-
tion. This means a patentee ﬁrm capable of doing D stage innovation itself (a
vertically integrated ﬁrm) will not gain by licensing to another ﬁrm to do D
stage innovation. If the patentee is unable to do D stage innovation itself (an
independent inventor or a vertically unintegrated ﬁrm), it will not gain by li-
censing to more than one ﬁrm. If there is to be multiple licensing, it would have
to be compulsory licensing (see Aoki and Nagaoka (2002) for how it works).
Such compulsory licensing can introduce D stage competition while not totally
25destroying D stage proﬁt. Thus, it may provide an eﬃcient balance between
non-patentability and patentability under certain circumstances.
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27Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In the following, X(θ) means X is a function of parameter θ which is







































R, we have −dP(XN
R )/dcR > −dP(XP









































28Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We ﬁrst show that the reduction of welfare due to decline in D stage
investment caused by the monopolization of D stage research is bounded from
below. Let us deﬁne k as satisfying v = rcD(1 + k)2, which provides a measure
of proﬁtability of the ﬁnal patent relative to the marginal cost of development.


































12Recall D stage investment with no patenting (or not patent) was X0 with spillover and
xb without. XN
D is deﬁned by
P(XN
D) = γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb).
From monotonicity of the function P(·), xb < XN
D < X0.









































































> (k + 2).












To show existence of c∗
R, we need to show that for suﬃciently small cR, the












R ) > 1 converging to 1 as cR approaches
zero. Monotonicity of WP/WN (Lemma 3) implies existence of c∗. This ends



















fR) − cRr in (17) goes to zero when cD or fD
becomes suﬃciently large and close to upper bound given by (9). Only caveat
is that k depends on cD meaning when cD becomes large, the lower bound of
(16) changes. Fortunately it moves to make the constraint less binding (right
hand side declines). Thus we can still use the bounds and we get the desired
inequality. Since we are not able to claim monotonicity of WP/WN with respect
30to development stage costs, we do not have a critical value as in parts (i) and
(ii).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Since P(XN
R ) is decreasing in γ and approaches 0, there is always a
γP > 0 such that
P(XP
R)P(XP
D) = P(XR((1 − γ)πb))P(X0).
For any γ ≥ γP,
P(XR((1 − γ)πb))P(X0) > P(XR((1 − γ)πb)){γP(X0) + (1 − γ)P(xb)}.
.
Proof of Proposition 4








For small θ1 and θ2, we have the following approximation,
1 − θ1
1 − θ2
≈ 1 − θ1 + θ2. (19)



































13Approximations are derived by ignoring all terms of order greater than 1
X2 . The approx-
imation can be arbitrarily close to the original expression by choosing X suﬃciently large.
31Although all ivestment levels are increasing in v, convergence speeds of the

































Thus for suﬃciently large v,
WP




























Figure 1: An Iso-welfare Curve  
 